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Introduction
The following summary was from the March 8, 2011 report provided to the Attorney General of the State of Florida by Gordon Yale:
At your request, I have reviewed various documents including annual Countrywide Financial Corporation ("CFC" or "Countrywide") Forms 10-K for the years ended December 31, 2002 through 2007 filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). I have also reviewed certain quarterly filings of CFC Forms 10-Q and various other SEC filings by CFC and Angelo R. Mozilo, extracts from transcripts of testimony by various Countrywide executives as well as a limited number of internal CFC e-mail provided to the state of Florida in this matter. In addition, I have read extracts from the deposition taken by the state of Florida of Mr. Mozilo, the former chairman and chief executive officer of Countrywide as well as other documents cited in footnotes to this report. The purpose of this review and analysis was to form certain opinions on matters related to this case. Based upon the endeavors I have described, my findings and opinions, to a reasonable degree of professional certainty, are as follows:
 From at least 2004 through June, 2008, CFC engaged in lending activities that various CFC executives, including Angelo Mozilo, knew were high risk to both to CFC and its borrowers.
 CFC's high-risk loans included subprime mortgages, subprime adjustable rate mortgages ("subprime ARMS"), home equity, home equity lines of credit (or "HELOCs") that were typically second lien loans, and Pay-option ARMS. Pay-option ARMS permitted negative amortization of the loan up to 115 percent of the initial borrowing.
 To reduce its risk of loss on these loans, CFC typically bundled its loans into residential mortgagebacked securities ("RMBS") and sold them to investors in the marketplace, retaining a residual interest. The design of many of these securitizations provided a structured hierarchy of investor rights to the cash flows that the underlying loans were expected to produce.
 Under generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") of the period, and since rescinded, CFC could account for a securitization as a sale of assets even if it retained a residual interest. As a result, CFC was permitted to recognize the present value of its estimated share of the future interest and in many instances, servicing income produced by the underlying loans in the RMBS upon the closing of the securitization transaction.
 Under most conditions, this accounting treatment permitted Countrywide to recognize more income during the period than it would have reported had it simply held the underlying loans on its balance sheet.
 The acceleration of CFC earnings, coupled with the securitization of higher risk assets, benefitted From Yale's findings and opinions, we have identified six lessons that should be learned from Countrywide's activities and history. Each is discussed below.
Lesson learned number 1: Do not ignore increasingly ubiquitous high risk loans and other high risk activities
For the twelve months ended December 31, 2002, Countrywide was the third largest home lender in the United States. 15 On a consolidated basis, CFC originated approximately $251 billion of home loans. The dollar value of its loan production was some 3.8 times larger than the loan production for the fiscal 2000 year. Of these $251 billion of loans originated in calendar 2002, nearly 86 percent were conventional conforming or non-conforming loans. More risky nonprime mortgage loans represented only 3.7 percent of originations while prime home equity loans, typically secured by second liens, were approximately 4.6 percent of originations.
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From December 31, 2002 to 2006, the originations of non-prime loans grew by more than 500 percent while prime home equity loans grew by nearly 400 percent during the four-year period. CFC did not specifically disclose the amount of Pay-option loans it originated, but Pay-options were generally classified as prime loans and were apparently classified as conventional and non-conforming. As will be more fully discussed in a subsequent section, Countrywide securitized most of the loans it originated. Conventional conforming, and initially some non-conforming, conventional loans could be securitized with no structured recourse to CFC. Subprime and home equity loans securitization structures, however, frequently provided that CFC (as the sponsor) retain a subordinated interest (or tranche) in the securitization to provide additional collateral to the more senior tranches. Such was the market in 2004 that Countrywide could securitize and sell some of these retained interests. Thus, Countrywide's structural exposure to loss would be limited to the retained interest in the retained interests it had sold through subsequent securitizations.
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Lesson learned number 3: Do not stay the course against ongoing risk warnings
While the e-mail discussed above precipitated a series of e-correspondence from Carlos Garcia, the CEO of Countrywide Bank, and to other CFC executives, the simple fact was that Countrywide continued making high-risk loans. As Table 1 Although home equity loans were not mentioned in the Mozilo e-mails, CFC knew that it was exposed to losses on its home equity loan and HELOC products because the loans were typically second lien loans and in some instances, these loans were piggybacked to make down payments on home purchases or were used in tandem with Pay-option loans. For by category because the amounts were not disclosed in CFC SEC filings. Clearly, the revenues from these products that Mr. Mozilo understood to be high risk were significant to Countrywide. Clearly, the Corporate Risk Management Committee was also enticed by these high profits and recommended no action to reduce dependence on such high risk investments.
Lesson learned number 5: Do a cost/benefit analysis on the securitization of loans and other high risk activities
Securitization-the bundling, sectioning and remarketing of financial assets-was the financial structure of choice in the mortgage markets of the new millennium. Financial institutions, like Countrywide, realized three primary benefits from securitization structures largely because of permissive accounting rules under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"). These primary benefits included:
 Off balance sheet treatment of assets and liabilities arising from transactions that were often, in substance, secured loans with limited recourse to the borrower.
 The immediate recognition of interest income, typically earned only with the passage of time.
 The immediate recognition of revenue from mortgage loan servicing prior to doing the actual work.
Until the rules were reversed for calendar-year companies beginning on January 1, 2010, these benefits were perfectly legitimate under GAAP for an entire generation. Securitizations took many forms and employed a variety of structures, but the elements common to each are the aggregation of income producing financial assets that are in turn transferred to a bankruptcy remote entity, typically a trust, and then carved into pieces (or tranches) that have a structured hierarchy of rights to the anticipated cash that the assets were expected to generate. The financially engineered product was then remarketed much as a note or a bond-that is, a debt instrument secured in this case by mortgage loansbut sold as a series of tranches, each with different risks and correspondingly different returns. In many securitizations, the tranches were (and continue to be) parsed so that the most senior tranche has the first right to virtually all the cash generated by the underlying assets that collateralized the security.
When and only when the periodic interest and principal due the senior tranche were paid, the remaining cash flowed to the next, most senior tranche in the hierarchy and so on down to each of the remaining subordinate tranches. Deconstructed to their simplest terms, many securitization transactions were (and continue to be) little more than a secured loan with recourse, often limited recourse, to the borrower. But because GAAP treated even these securitization transactions as a sale, the benefits of the structure multiplied.
First, qualifying securitizations were off balance sheet. Countrywide, for example, typically bundled the mortgage loans it originated and sold them. If it sold virtually all of its economic interests in a particular pool of mortgages and had no meaningful continuing economic rights or obligations, then the transaction was clearly a sale. The underlying mortgages would be removed from Countrywide's balance sheet and transferred to the purchaser. The amounts paid to Countrywide would be revenue and profit, and could be determined simply by subtracting Countrywide's cost of the mortgages and the retained benefits from the revenue it received from their sale.
On the other hand, if the purchasers of the various tranches insisted that Countrywide continue to
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hold a significant interest in the security, and the interest retained by Countrywide was the most subordinate tranche, reducing it to the first loss piece in the event that the underlying mortgages defaulted, then the economic substance of the securitization looked more like a secured loan, with limited recourse, than a sale. Further, if that same subordinate tranche held by Countrywide had the right to the excess cash flows, from the difference between the interest generated by the underlying mortgages and the interest paid to the holders of the more senior tranches, then the subordinate tranche was not just excess collateral for the benefit of the more senior tranches. It provided Countrywide the continuing economic benefit of the interest spread that could be valuable.
Under this scenario-where the securitization structure produced substantially the same benefits of a secured loan with limited recourse-it should have been hard to argue that it wasn't a secured loan with limited recourse. Despite the logic, if the transaction met GAAP requirements, GAAP permitted such transactions to be treated as asset sales. As asset sales, mortgages would be removed from Countrywide's balance sheet and no debt obligation to security holders would be recorded.
Gain on Sale
Countrywide and every other sponsor of securitizations realized other benefits of securitization to their bottom line. Because the accounting rules treated such conforming transactions as sales, Countrywide was permitted to recognize a profit (or loss) when the securitization transaction closed. One element of the determination of the profit was the valuation of the sponsor's continuing interest in the spread between the interest received from the underlying mortgages and the interest paid to security holders and other retained interests. That spread was typically greater on the securitization of high-risk loans such as subprime and home equity products. As a result, the gains from the sale of subprime or home equity securitizations were larger.
This was consistently true at Countrywide (See Table 3 
above).
A number of factors, including prepayments and defaults, impacted the value of the interest spread. For example, the duration of a mortgage impacted the length of time the interest spread would be realized. Similarly, defaulted loans had the potential to lower the interest spreads. Thus, the valuation of the sponsor's residual in the interest spread from the securitization was something of a guess. And because credit standards were deteriorating and new products were introduced, the estimation process had significant uncertainty. GAAP was wholly inconsistent on this issue. The senior tranche owners of securitizations recognized interest earnings in their financial statements only if mortgages remained outstanding and interest accrued. In other words, they recognized interest earnings periodically, with the passage of time, which determined whether interest on a loan was earned and ultimately, whether it would be paid. Securitization sponsors, however, recognized the present worth of the estimated interest due them upfront.
Mortgage Servicing Rights
The third primary benefit of securitization was the recognition of profit on mortgage servicing rights ("MSRs"). Countrywide, like a number of sponsors, sold loans into securitization pools of mortgages, but retained the right to administer or service the mortgage for a fee of between 25 and 50 bps annually. 36 When sponsors securitized mortgage loans, but retained mortgage servicing rights, the MSRs were considered to be a retained interest requiring valuation. Moreover, the estimated value of MSRs was utilized in the determination of the gain on sale from the securitization. The values were derived from the present worth of the estimated future cash flows from mortgage servicing fees.
And like the interest spread, estimated value of the MSRs was recorded at the close of the securitization transaction although the 25 to 50 bps of fee income would be earned in each future year that the mortgages were outstanding. Because many factors, including interest rate movements, loan prepayments, delinquencies and defaults impacted the length of time a mortgage loan would remain outstanding as well as how long servicing fees would be paid, the estimate was uncertain and somewhat volatile.
Despite the uncertainty in estimating the value of residual interests and MSRs, two primary components of the gain on sale calculation, the impact on Countrywide's financial statements was highly significant. Table 5 recapitulates CFC's gains on sale related to home equity and subprime loans securitizations and the related, estimated income from mortgage servicing on home equity and subprime loans as well as income from CFC residual interests from its high risk loan securitizations. These amounts were recorded in Countrywide's income statements. The tenuous nature of recognizing massive gains on sale that were largely dependent on estimates of revenue that had been recognized, but not earned, did not become fully apparent in CFC financial statements until 2007, when declining home prices and other factors compelled CFC to record multi-billion dollar impairment charges against its retained interests. Once again, the Corporate Risk Management Committee did not analyze possible risks by doing a cost/benefit or other analysis on the securitization of loans or any other high risk business strategies since the benefits were so appealing and enticing. But despite Mr. Mozilo's continued and well founded concern, the Pay-option ARM loan balance held for investment in the CFC Banking Operations segment grew from $26.1 billion to $32.7 billion at calendar year-over-year and peaked at nearly $35.4 billion September 30, 2006. 39 The average loan-tovalue on Pay-option ARM products did not decline from 2005 to 2006, but the average FICO score decreased slightly from 720 to 718. Pay-option ARM delinquencies grew from .1 percent to .63 percent of bank operating assets, but the allowance for loan losses as a percentage of non-accruing loans actually declined year-over-year. 40 Mr. Mozilo was also rightly concerned about CFC's subprime products. In a March 28, 2006 e-mail, apparently written in reaction to a CFC buy back of a pool of 100 percent LTV subprime loans as a result of indemnifications provisions, Mr. Table 7 ). Despite generally increasing volumes in higher risk loan production-particularly subprime, home equity and non-conforming products (including Payoptions and Alt-A loans)-Countrywide's earnings grew a total of 12.7 percent in the four-year period from 2003 through 2006, but the growth rate in CFC's production of risky products was substantially faster. Table 8 recapitulates growth by loan category. The growth in higher risk loan production (See Table 1 above), the majority of which was shoveled off of Countrywide's balance sheet through securitizations, did not produce increases in CFC's gains on sale. In fact, gains on sale declined between 2003 and 2006 from nearly $5.9 billion to almost $5.7 billion.
One of the reasons CFC's gains on sale declined and its net income increased only modestly between 2003 and 2006 was that spreads on higher risk loans had narrowed. Per Table 3 above, gains on sale as a percentage of loans sold declined significantly in three major categories: prime loan gains on sale declined from 1.40 percent of loans sold to 1.07 percent; subprime dropped from 4.43 percent to 1.84 percent and prime home equity declined from 1.90 percent to 1.71 percent. 46 The decline in prime loan spreads occurred despite the fact that CFC's mix of loans changed dramatically. In 2003, conforming loan 46 Countrywide changed its reporting on home equity lending so the more highly profitable subsequent draws on home equity loans have not been considered in this analysis. Coupled with increasing operating expenses, the declines in securitization gain on sale margins apparently compelled Countrywide not only to originate and sell more high risk loans, but also to keep substantially greater amounts of loans it knew to be high risk on its balance sheet. In other words, to grow profits, CFC took substantially more risk. Additional risks included holding increasing amounts of nonprime and home equity retained interests-often the first loss tranche of the securitization-as well as carrying significantly greater amounts of home equity, subprime and Pay-option loans on its balance sheet.
In other words, while net income was substantially stagnant between 2003 and 2006, Countrywide literally put the company on the line when it more than doubled its exposure to high-risk loans and residual interests to generate earnings and meet competitive demands. 47 Moreover, despite the higher risks, profits on securitizations were declining. Table 9 For the year ended December 31, 2007, CFC reported a net loss of more than $703 million. The amount included nearly $2.3 billion of loan loss provisions and some $2.38 billion of impairment charges on its retained interests from securitizations. The day before the Bank of America announcement that it would acquire Countrywide for about $7.16 per share, CFC shares increased 51 percent to $7.75. After the official announcement on January 11, 2008, Countrywide's shares declined to $6.33.
Once again, the Corporate Risk Management Committee did no stress tests or other analyses to assess any of the risks related to these mortgage investments and securitizations and continued to ignore the CEO's repeated risk warnings.
Summary
Howard Schilit (2010), the well-known forensic accountant, has stated that the one lesson we have learned from history is that we have learned nothing from history, and he has recommended that to find fraud, we must study the history of fraud. Similarly, this observation can carry over to study the history of risk management leading up to the economic recession in order to understand and develop good risk management practices by both management and boards of directors for better corporate governance. Thus, this paper has developed six risk management lessons learned from the history of Countrywide:
1 He agreed to pay $67.5 million in fines and accepted a lifetime ban from serving as an officer or director of any public company. The SEC settlement was the largest by an executive connected to the 2008 housing collapse and financial crisis. The fine represented a small fraction of Mozilo's estimated net worth of $600 million and Countrywide paid $20 of the $67.5 million penalty, due to an indemnification agreement that was part of Mozilo's employment contract. The terms of the settlement allowed Mozilo to avoid acknowledging any wrongdoing and in February 2011, the criminal investigation against him was dropped.
